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Abstract
A blockchain framework is presented for addressing the privacy and security challenges associ-
ated with the Big Data in smart mobility. It is composed of individuals, companies, government
and universities where all the participants collect, own, and control their data. Each participant
shares their encrypted data to the blockchain network and can make information transactions with
other participants as long as both party agrees to the transaction rules (smart contract) issued by
the owner of the data. Data ownership, transparency, auditability and access control are the core
principles of the proposed blockchain for smart mobility Big Data.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally personal mobility data were solicited via small-scale surveys (1-5% sample) and govern-
ments would take the responsibility to secure the personal information before sharing for public use.
Nowadays smartphones, cellphone towers, Wi-Fi hotspots, transit counters, traffic sensors, automatic
toll payment systems, among others, can passively solicit detailed mobility data of the urban popu-
lation. Processing and analyzing passively as well as actively solicited data has the potential to aid
governments and researchers to better understand human mobility for designing smarter, demand-
driven, reliable and secure transportation systems. To fully exploit the potential of passively solicited
large-scale data, privacy and security challenges need to be addressed. Passively solicited data include
sensitive personal information like GPS logs or trip and activity habits, so guarding people’s privacy
and securing their information from untrusted parties is of utmost importance.
In recent years, cyber-security breaches have occurred all around the globe and transportation
systems are not any exception. In 2015 a group of civic hackers deciphered and exposed the unstan-
dardized bus system location data of Baltimore The Baltimore Sun [2015]. In 2016 the San Fransisco
transit was hacked to give free access to commuters for two days Wired [2016]. In the same year,
information of 57 million Uber customers and drivers were leakedCTV New Toronto [2017]. In 2018
the Ontario’s regional transportation agency, Metrolinx’s server was attack The Guardian [2018].
Blockchain technology has the potential to protect individual’s personal mobility information and
guard their privacy. The technology is difficult to tamper with and transactions are secure as well as
transparent to all parties–including the individuals who generated the data.
A blockchain is a distributed data structure Christidis and Devetsikiotis [2016], database Kim and
Laskowski [2018] or shared ledger Swan [2015] that maintains a list of transaction records, which cannot
be altered unless a consensus in the network is reached via proof-of-work, proof-of-stake or a byzantine
fault tolerance variant. The blockchain is formed by timestamped block containing transactions and
where each block is permanently linked to a previous block Nakamoto [2008]. Thus the blockchain
presents a perfect solution for developing a smart network for mobility data where all the transactions
are transparent (a public ledger is available to the interested parties in the network), democratic (a
consensus must be reached to accept transaction) and secure (linked blocks make difficult to tamper
the network). In this paper a blockchain framework for smart mobility data transactions is proposed.
The main objective is to secure the collected data and to maintain the privacy of the individuals. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows: We first introduce the background on how blockchain can
solve data management problems and privacy issues in the context of smart mobility. We describe the
Blockchain framework for Mobility Data Transactions. The data shared on the network as well as the
rules of participation are discussed. An adversary model is presented to identify groups of attackers
and how their attacks can be prevented or made difficult to succeed. At the end of the paper, a case
study and concluding discussion are presented.
2 Background
The concept of blockchain was first developed for the Bitcoin currency Nakamoto [2008]. However, in
recent years the blockchain networks have gained tremendous attention due to the properties related
to creating secure and private networks where no single organization is in control of the transactions
and the data. It’s promise is to decentralize and democratize all transactions from food to virtual
currency Leon Zhao et al. [2017]. Nevertheless little research has been done outside the world of
Bitcoins and its variants, only around 20% of all research papers on blockchain focus on problems not
related to cryptocurrencies Yli-Huumo et al. [2016]. Next we present studies related to the blockchain
applications in transportation and privacy.
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Supply chain management is one of the main transportation applications of blockchain. The stake-
holders can track their goods along the complete chain and they do not need to rely on a centralized
entity for authenticity of the branded products Crosby et al. [2016]. In combination with RFID tech-
nology Tian [2016] Androulaki et al. [2018] Kim and Laskowski [2018], the blockchain would allow
the companies to track products from the creation to the delivery to the final consumer and will help
them to improve their businesses by quickly identifying problems in the chain.
Blockchain can also be used to tackle transportation supply problems. In Sharma et al. [2017]
the authors propose a blockchain network, where vehicles share their resources (fuel consumption,
speed logs, space available, among others) in order to find cheap fuel stations, people for ride-sharing,
or to probe good driving behavior in order to get discounts in insurance policies. The blockchain
mobility consortium Consortium proposed to share and monetize the driver’s information to improve
network performance and to make money while driving. Applications like Arcade City City are
proposing to share their trips in a shared mobility service, but without third parties involvement
in the transaction. Shared mobility can exploit the use of blockchain to connect drivers and riders
with no third parties intermediaries, however as Stocker and Shaheen [2016] pointed out, some issues
like regulatory uncertainty, liability issues and network optimization need to be address before fully
implementing blockchain for shared mobility.
Maintaining individual’s privacy is currently one of the key challenges faced by various industries
and researchers. Almost every part of our lives is stored on servers owned by various companies.
Previously, in transportation techniques like hashing function have been used to anonymize user data
Farooq et al. [2015]. Public and private key encryption techniques have been used for data and
communication security Farooq et al. [2015]. However researchers and technologist have found that
blockchain can be a potential solution to privacy problem by decentralizing information and by making
the individuals the sole owners and controllers of their information. Blockchain can be used to securely
share private information in: medical networks Yue et al. [2016], IoT networks Dorri et al. [2017],
access-control managers Zyskind et al. [2015], smart grids Aitzhan and Svetinovic [2016] and data
provenance in cloud computing Liang et al. [2017]. However, to the authors knowledge, in the literature
there is no record of a generalized blockchain framework for smart mobility data transactions that can
guard the privacy of individuals and protect against hacking. The framework presented in this work
can be a solution to the privacy and security challenges of sharing actively as well as passively solicited
large-scale smart mobility data.
3 Conceptual framework
The level of permission is the first step in the creation of a blockchain, e.g., in the Bitcoin blockchain
anybody can participate and all the transactions are publicly available. Essentially there are four
types of permissions Ølnes et al. [2017]:
1. Public closed : Anyone can do the transactions and have access to the data. Only a restricted
set of participants can be involve in consensus mechanism.
2. Public open: Anyone can do the transactions, have access to the data and can participate in
consensus mechanisms.
3. Private closed : Restricted access to transactions, have access to the data and the consensus
mechanisms. Only the owner determines who can participate.
4. Private open: Restriction on access and who can transact. All participants can be involved in
consensus mechanism.
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Figure 1: Blockchain network and data collectors
The main disadvantage of open blockchains, either private or public, is the amount of energy
necessary to reach consensus (the estimated energy consumption of Bitcoin is 100MW Vranken [2017]).
In the authors’ opinion it will be better to consider an eco-friendlier path and to opt for a network
with less consumption of energy. We propose a close blockchain as the energy necessary to run this
type of network is considerably less than an open counterpart.
The decision between private or public has to be taken in terms of access to the ledger and partic-
ipation. In private only the owner determines who can participate, giving such power to one entity or
entities may lead to undemocratic process and can hurt the people’s trust. The public blockchain may
fit better in the proposed framework as the participation is open to the public. However, in this type
of networks the ledger is also public, so in order to protect the privacy of the individuals the personal
information is encrypted and only the owners can grant permission to open selected data. Neverthe-
less, we believe choosing the right type of blockchain, especially one that stores personal information,
should be a decision taken by all parties involved, society, government and companies need to discuss
this in deep.
Fig. 1 shows the general framework of a public closed Blockchain for Smart Mobility Data (BSMD)
composed of nodes: Individuals, Companies, Universities and Government (transport, census, planing
and development agencies). The nodes collect their own data and are the sole owners of their infor-
mation. All data is encrypted in the network with a personal key and transaction of data between
nodes are made via Smart Contracts. In the following paragraphs the data sources, data ownership
and smart contract are explained in more details.
3.1 Data sources
Mobility data is constantly generated by different nodes. There are several companies producing trans-
port information which is valuable to governments, researchers and people. For example, telecommu-
nication companies generate data that can be used for transportation modeling, the logs of available
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mobile devices registered by cellphone towers or Wi-Fi hotspots can be used to monitor traffic Farooq
et al. [2015] or to capture the individual’s daily activity patterns Phithakkitnukoon et al. [2010]. The
companies can also take advantage of the blockchain to find customers or use the data generated by
Government, Universities or other Companies to improve their business. It is worth to note that ac-
cording to the BSMD framework companies are in control of their data so they decide to what extent
they want to share information.
One of the responsibilities of the government is to collect data in order to model, manage and
improve transportation networks. Information on tolls, Smart-Card, traffic detectors, surveys, parking
and property can be use to find new ways for shaping our mobility. For example, toll information and
traffic detectors can be used to optimize operators objective trough dynamic toll rates Toledo et al.
[2017] and Smart-Card fare data can be used to indirectly infer trip purpose Alsger et al. [2018].
Universities often need to collect particular data not collected by government or companies. This
data is often targeted to specific porpoises like the state-preferences surveys, detailed car emissions or
driver behavior.
The biggest collector of transportation data are the individuals and their smartphones. Everyday
people generate GPS points, speed, direction, mode choice, among others. In summary personal
information is useful for:
• Researchers to develop cutting-edge solution for transport.
• Governments to plan and build better transportation systems.
• Companies to provide customized products or services.
However to get people’s trust and to prevent the misuse of their information universities, government
an companies must provide a private and secure system for the use of personal information
3.2 Smart contracts
A smart contract is a set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which the
parties perform on these promises Szabo [1996]. A smart contract can be viewed as a script which
defines the set of assets available to transfer and the type of transactions permitted. All smart contracts
are stored in the blockchain and have a unique address. They act as independent actors Christidis
and Devetsikiotis [2016] whose objective is to transact assets given a certain set of rules that involved-
parties agreed upon.
In the BSMD every participant of the network defines their own smart contracts and can only be
modified by the owner of the data. All the nodes in the network can only define smart contracts for
the data they own as well as people can only define smart contracts for the information they collect
through their cellphones or by other means.
A smart contract in the BSMD is composed of the following functions:
• A function to accept connections.
• A function to grant permissions to other parties to selected information.
• A function to revoke connections.
Figure 2 shows a transaction using a smart contract where an individual share selected personal
data with two nodes. All data transactions are recorded in the ledger and nodes have full access to
the parts of the ledger that contains their data. In this way, they can control where their information
is and can detect if there is an unwanted share to untrusted nodes.
4
User
Name
Age
Address
GPS
Accelerometer
Smart contract
Age
GPS
Node 1
Name
Address
GPS
Node 2
Figure 2: Smart contract and transaction
Once a node accepts a connection it selects the information it is willing to share. As long as the
connection is present in the smart contract the receiver has access to the information. When a node
requests information from another node the following steps are met:
1. A receiving-node requests a connection to the smart contract.
2. The smart contract confirms if the receiving-node has access to the information and accepts the
connection
3. The nodes starts sharing information in a peer-to-peer connection.
4. The shared data can only be accessed as long as the connection is present in the smart contract.
3.3 Users privacy
Making the users the owners and controllers of their information is vital for generating trust so
individuals feel safe when sharing their information. The proposed blockchain tackles the following
privacy issues:
• Data Ownership. Nowadays companies own peoples mobility data and individuals cannot revoke
access unless they opting-out. Even in that case the company may not entirely delete their
information. In the BSMD the people own their data and if they want to leave the network their
information is deleted from the blockchain.
• Data Transparency and Auditability. There have been many cases where companies share per-
sonal data to untrusted parties while the individuals are not aware of. In the proposed framework
each individual can access parts of the ledger where their information is involved. In this manner
they can know all the transaction involving them. Authorities may have full access to the ledger
for auditability purposes.
• Fine-grained Access Control. In case of the companies, individuals cannot choose which infor-
mation they are willing to share and sometimes they cannot revoke access to specific parts of
the information. With the smart contracts individuals can manage the access to specific parts
of their information.
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Figure 4: CarbonCount Blockchain network and data collectors
3.4 Adversaries
The main goal of BSMD framework is to protect the personal mobility information and secure the
privacy of the people in order to fully exploit the benefits of actively or passively solicited large-scale
data. To measure the level of protection in BSMD, four groups of adversaries are identified whose
attacks can be prevented or hindered thanks to the use of the blockchain. Groups of adversaries may
attack the network, the nodes or when the information is been transfered (see Figure 3). The identified
groups of adversaries are:
1. Data interception: all information transactions are via a unique and secure peer-to-peer connec-
tion, so attacking a single node may not worth the effort required to decrypt the data.
2. Data leaks: all the personal information are decentralized and secured for every individual, so
massive leaks on information will require huge amounts of power to hack data on a meaningful
number of individuals. Also the interceptions of multiple connections at the same time will
require the interception of all connections so the computing power to do this task may not be
viable.
3. Unsolicited share of information: every mode has full access to the parts of the ledger where
their information is involved so they can easily verify his information is where they want.
4. Unsolicited request of information: smart contracts let the node decide the information they
want to share with specific nodes.
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4 Test case
A test case is implemented for the CarbonCount Laboratory of Innovations in Transportation [2018]
application that collects mobile sensor data (GPS, speed, direction and MAC address) and personal
information from residents and share it with Markham government and Ryerson University in Canada.
The goal of CarbonCount is to analyze personal mobility data to convince users to shift from cars to
a cleaner modes (e.g. walk, shared-mobility, and biking) to reduce their carbon footprint. To share
information between the nodes in a private and secure way the CarbonCount BSMD is build upon
Hyperledger Indy hyp, which is a public permisioned blockchain for decentralized digital identities and
the exchange of information in secure peer-to-peer connections.
The Figure 4 shows the CarbonCount BSMD formed by the residents of Markham, Ryerson Uni-
versity, Markham government, transportation service providers and transportation consultants. On
CarbonCount platform, Ryerson node will need access to the individuals origin, destination and ma-
chine inferred modes of transport to give alternative greener transport choices. Any smart contract
with Ryerson must have at least these information available if the user wants to participate in the
CarbonCount app. However, if the user wants to get an alternative path that better fits their needs
or suggestion in terms of activity locations/scheduling, they can opt to share more information with
Ryerson. For example, if a user also share their GPS logs a tailored itinerary for reducing the emis-
sions can be suggested. All the nodes in the network can share information for free or in exchange of
services as long as the transaction are made via smart contracts.
The mobility and personal data of the nodes are stored in a Digital Identification that no one can
revoke, co-opt or correlate without their permission. The CarbonCount BSMD ledger is public and is
composed of Identity Records associated to a Decentralized Identifiers (DID). The Identity Records are
registries of the type of transaction and the type of connected nodes, e.g., a GPS points transaction
between an individual node and a government node. The DID is a sequence of bits that is generated
when a connection between two nodes is made.
Figure 5 shows an example of a connection and a ledger submission in the CarbonCount BSMD.
In Step 1 the node sends a connection request to the smart contract of the individual. In Step 2
the individual selects which information they are willing to share and accepts the connection in the
following manner:
• First a secure peer-to-peer connection is established. Transactions are direct, with no involved
intermediaries to reduce the information leaks.
LEDGER
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Identity
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DID
Identity
Record
DIDI
Identity
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Individual
Node
Node
Digital Id
-Name
-Gender
-Age
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Figure 5: Transaction between two nodes in the CarbonCount blockchain
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• Then, two Decentralized Identifiers (DID) are created, the individual creates a DIDI and sends
it to the node, while the node creates a DIDN and sends it to the individual. It is worth noting
that every time a connection is established a DID is created, so a single node or individual can
have multiple DIDs assigned.
• Finally, the individual sends the requested information to the node. In the example shown in
Figure 5 the individual sends their GPS logs and gender information to the node.
Finally in Step 3 the node submit to the ledger an identity record associated to the DIDI so the
individual can audit the ledger each time a transaction is made using their information. The validation
of transactions are performed by a set of trusted nodes (Ryerson, Government and companies) running
a Byzantine fault tolerant protocol.
Although other nodes or individuals have access to the ledger they cannot identify the nodes
making the transaction, they can only know “two nodes are transacting information of type x”, so the
individual privacy is protected. Also each node has a different DID per connection making it difficult
to correlate DIDs and infer the identity of the individual.
5 Conclusions
The Blockchain framework for Smart Mobility Data (BSMD) transactions is presented to solve the pri-
vacy and security issues related to the sharing of passively as well as actively solicited large-scale data.
Data from individuals, governments, universities and companies are distributed on the network and
stored in a decentralized manner, the data transactions are recorded and must have the authorization
of the owners.
The analysis and processing of personal mobility data can improve our transportation systems and
make our lives more comfortable whether in terms of going to work, building new facilities or to reduce
carbon footprint. However, personal mobility data include several aspects of life that must be private,
and if researchers, government and companies want to use personal data they must respect the basic
human right of privacy.
The BSMD is built on the principles of: (a) User Privacy, multiple DIDs assigned to a single user
to anonymize the information and make it difficult to correlate the data (b) Data Ownership, each
user owns a Digital Identifier and can revoke connections; (c) Data Transparency and Auditability,
anyone can access the ledger and nodes can track all the transactions involving their information; (d)
Fine-grained Access Control, smart-contracts define what information the node is willing to share.
This is an ongoing research to develop an operational and scalable blockchain architecture for
transacting transportation data where people can trust the network as their information is private
and securely distributed. The BSMD implementation will be a step forward in the use of Big Mobility
Data in Smart Cities and citizen empowerment.
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